316 tivity of the basin achieved a level which has not been equalled since. It must be admitted, however, that during the last war the Nazis wantonly exploited the coal mines under martial law, with little regard for their future maintenance.

The Silesian coal basin, as such, suffered less damage from direct military action in 1944-1945 than from the strain on manpower, machinery, and installations during the years of war. In 1945 the whole of Upper Silesia was reunited with Poland. Its German population fled or was expelled westwards, while one million minority Poles were recognized as "autochthones" and stayed in Silesia. Since most of the coal miners in the formerly German western part of Upper Silesia belonged to that category, the mines could be worked without interruption. In 1945, too, the Kremlin adjudged the disputed eastern Karvinna mines to Czechoslovakia along the 1937 boundary. There are no Germans left either in Polish Silesia or in the Ostrava basin where they used to be numerous, but there are many Polish miners employed in the latter area. It should be stressed that the former German coal mines in Upper Silesia were situated not more than twenty miles from the prewar boundary, and that the Polish and Czech coal fields are not immediately contiguous. As a matter of course, the present division of the Silesian coal basin between the two Slav neighbors has far more justification from the technical point of view and may be regarded as stable.

[648] In 1947 the Warsaw and Prague governments agreed, in principle, to some measure of collaboration in coal mining, but no joint administration of the nationalized coal mines was created. It is possible that one of the difficulties was that the Poles produce in their part of the basin nearly four times as much coal as the Czechs in theirs, while any joint controlling body would have to be based on parity. In the last analysis, the coal policy of both Poland and Czechoslovakia in Silesia and elsewhere has been conducted since 1948 from Moscow, and there are Russian "advisers" with controlling power in Silesia as well as in all secondary coal basins of the captive area.

The level and character of the coal output in Silesia has always

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of the State, to an extent undreamed of in Czarist Russia. We were wont, many of us, to make uncomplimentary references to the clergy of the old regime. Some of the strictures were too sweeping. But, alas, what we must be prepared to say about the Russian Church under the Soviets is far more devastating. It has become an institution which all but blesses the concentration camp system, and escorts slave labor to its doom with a kind of liturgical brass band.

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The Soviet objective is to reduce religious organizations outside Russia to the status of the Orthodox Church at home. The formula is always and everywhere the same, though it may be applied with greater or lesser rigor. Therefore inevitably the Vatican becomes the great antagonist, to be fought with every means. The Holy See, pledged to the profession of the Christian Gospels without dilution of the ethical obligations which they impose upon everyone who accepts them in the Catholic sense, cannot agree that the Church is to be an instrument of the State —even, indeed, a benign and merciful instrument. The Vatican is therefore the ignoble Fascist Beast of the Bolshevik Apocalypse. Upon the heads of persons who remain loyal to the ancient See of Catholic Christendom, blows have rained in constant succession. This is the direst persecution the Church has suffered since the days of the Caesars.

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Because most of what may be reported concerns the Catholic Church, a brief review of its history and endeavors in Eastern Europe will help to bring events into perspective. The cleavage of the Roman Empire, establishing the rivalry between the emperors of Rome and Byzantium, begot two Churches also, each claiming for itself the charisma of Apostolic Christianity. With the passing of time, profound differences of a dogmatic, moral, and canonical kind developed. The organizational character of religion was also modified radically, so that, while in the East the ties binding the religious nations to the historic pa-

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175 795 641 The great Councils to which we have referred opened in a spirit of optimism, despite the nationalistic bickering to which Europe was then subject. The Greeks were in a conciliatory mood, due largely to their need of Western allies against the followers of Mohammed, but they arrived in Europe at a time of bitter conflict over whether a Council took precedence over the Pope. The Decree of Union did not satisfy the great mass of the Greeks, even though the overwhelming majority of their ecclesiastical representatives assented to it in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor. The only positive result was the formation of the Greek Churches in union with Rome, usually called the Uniate Churches. In Russia, as we have seen, the Czar vetoed any plan of reunion.

But the great dream of reunion did not die, and after World War I it was revived especially by Pope Pius XI, who had intimate personal knowledge of conditions in Eastern Europe from the high vantage point of the Holy See. Institutions under the auspices of the Papacy were established to promote the achievement of One Fold and One Shepherd. At the same time the Protestant Ecumenical Council likewise began to search for ways in which to draw the Eastern Churches into union, with the Churches bound together under its roof. These efforts were not wholly useless, but it was again obvious that the disunity of the Christian West had puzzled and confused rather than attracted the East.

175 829 795 Meanwhile great changes had taken place. The Papacy was compelled to reckon with the rise of secularism, which swept across Eastern Europe from the West during the nineteenth century. Medieval ecclesiastical institutions were widely identified with feudalism; and in addition new intellectual and scientific movements gave rise to a widespread conviction that religion was in itself a barrier to the development of the good, or at least the prosperous, society. The attack on feudalism

[1. Councils of Ferrara and Florence, 15th cent. - Analyst.]

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incapacity of Russia to supply their needs made it more and more pressing for them to try to get equipment from Western Europe. This need expressed itself in the case of Yugoslavia in a revolt against the Moscow ukase (see Part III, *The Rebellious Satellite*) and in the case of the other satellites in an appeal to the West to supply the goods—an appeal that, because of its expediency, was not vetoed by Moscow. At the Conference of the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations, the Polish and Czech delegates asked for trade with Western Europe, by which they could obtain capital goods. The Bulgarian delegate stated that his country could not improve her economic position to any extent without increasing her imports, especially of machines, from the West. (United Nations Documents, E/ECE/SR4/1-25).

Russia, with the majority of her population engaged in agriculture, is faced with the same problem as her satellites (apart from the Czech lands of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria)—large-scale industrialisation. The terrible destruction suffered by the U.S.S.R. in World War II, as well as the preparations for World War III, which require the same materials as industrialisation—steel, coal, machinery, etc.—render Russia even less able to help the countries of Eastern Europe.

Dismantling, Looting, Requisitioning

When the populations of Eastern Europe, mainly of the ex-enemy countries, first met the Russian Army and State officials, they did not see them bringing gifts, supplying machinery, locomotives, etc., but looting their country.

Stalin forgot that the Communist International had preached for years against the reparation articles of the Versailles Treaty, and had reiterated that the German workers bore the real burden of reparations, although they did not profit in any way from the war. In World War II the crimes of the Nazi Army were incomparably worse than those of the Kaiser Army in World War I, yet the German people drew no benefit at all from this. On the contrary, the first victim of the Hitler terror was the German people itself. The 800 thousand German Communists, Socialists, trade unionists, Catholics, etc. (not including the German Jews) who passed through prisons and

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concentration camps in the twelve years of Hitler's rule are testimony to this. What magnificent heroism on the part of unarmed and helpless people to challenge the brutal state machine with its all-seeing eye and unlimited terror!

The Communist Parties knew all this very well. Immediately after June 1941 they emphasised that this time, because of Russia's part in the war, no new Versailles Treaty with reparations clauses would be imposed and that the German people would not be made to pay for the crimes of their rulers. The German proletariat, they said, was not more responsible for the war than the English or the French, and they repeated the same views on the question of reparations as the Communist International had after World War I. At that time the leaders of the French Communist Party explained why the French workers should oppose the exaction of reparations from Germany. Thus Gabriel Peri wrote in an article entitled 'On the Eve of the Reparations Conference': '. . . the workers of France and Germany have only *one* interest, viz., that of forming a revolutionary front against financial capital and the heavy industries in both countries. For the enormous sums at stake (the reparations—YG) will naturally be squeezed out of the working masses'. (*International Press Correspondence*, February 1st, 1929).

But all this changed with the hope of Russian victory. With Russia becoming the Power able to extract reparations, her opposition in principle to reparations vanished. Instead she decided to take reparations on a far larger scale than ever the French Government had dared after World War I.

Edward Charles in his article 'Reparations, 1919-31', in *The Banker* of April, 1945, writes on the reparations that Germany paid after the first world war: 'Reparations before the Dawes Plan brought in some 8 milliard gold marks. From September, 1924, to the end they yielded a further 10 milliards'. There is no reliable calculation of the national income of Germany between the end of the first world war and the introduction of the Dawes Plan. It is therefore impossible to calculate what proportion of the national income reparations made up. But for the years 1924-32 this figure is available. The total national income of Germany for these 9 years was calculated at 564.3 milliard marks, and in the same period

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Germany paid reparations to the extent of 9.8 milliard marks, or 1.7 per cent of the national income. In no year after the first world war did the reparations paid by Germany exceed 4 per cent of the national income. To calculate the burden of these reparations, other criteria besides the national income, such as budget revenue or exports, can be applied. The reparations Germany paid rose from 12.9 per cent of the budget revenue of Germany or 9.9 per cent of the value of its exports in 1924-5, to 25.7 per cent and 18.4 per cent respectively in 1928-9.

With regard to Germany's looting of Europe during the second world war, German official statistics admit that up to 194[illegible] the Reich got from the occupied countries 'special incomes' amounting to 50 milliard marks. British official estimates give a figure of 12.8 milliard dollars for the same period. The two figures thus nearly tally. Nearly all the German robbery took place immediately after the occupation. If we, therefore, assume that the annual looting of the occupied cou[illegible]s by Germany after 1943 was the same as the annual average of 1939 to 1943, we shall certainly not underestimate it: on this basis the total German looting amounted to 20-25 milliard dollars.

A comparison between the reparations paid by Germany after the first world war—about 18 milliard marks or 3.6 milliard dollars—with the 'reparations' that Germany took from Europe in the second world war—20-25 milliard dollars—reveals the increasingly plunderous character of declining capitalism, as exemplified by the Hitler regime.

Russia's attitude to the question of reparations after the second world war was expressed clearly by Prof. Varga in an article published in *War and the Working Class*, 15th October, 1943. He concluded that Germany must pay reparations to the tune of 90 milliard marks or about 22 milliard dollars, and he stated that the Russian government asked in addition for ten million German workers to be sent to Russia for reconstruction work.

A claim for such large reparations, coupled with a demand for ten million workers, i.e., nearly a third of the total German working class, was incompatible with the existence of Germany as an important industrial country. At Yalta, consequently,

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● 648 728 Stalin had to demand that 80 per cent of German industry should be dismantled within two years of the cease-fire. (James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, London, 1948, pp. 26-7).

In view of the division of Germany between East and West, Russia did not want to exclude the possibility of the Communist Party's influencing the German people, and so she did not press her claim for ten million slave labourers or the dismantling of 80 per cent of German industry. Nevertheless the total sum lost by Germany directly and indirectly under the post-war arrangements in the East exceeded the total sum for which Varga asked.

It is difficult to get a full picture of this looting, as it was carried out in many guises, and those responsible for it were of course extremely anxious to conceal what was happening. But the following facts are incontestable.

First, millions of Germans were expelled from their homes and lost their property. The President of Poland, Bierut, estimated that Poland's gains in the West, i.e., from Germany, have an investment value of 9½ milliard dollars. The property of the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia was estimated at 4 milliard dollars. If we assume that the rest of the Germans who inhabited the former territory of Poland, Hungary, Rumania, etc., were on the average as wealthy as the inhabitants of the portion of Eastern Germany that was annexed to Poland and the Sudetan region, their property must be evaluated at about 6 milliard dollars. Therefore the expulsion of the Germans alone brought in 'reparations' amounting to about 20 milliard dollars.

The Yalta Agreement decided in principle that Germany would pay reparations amounting to 20 milliard dollars, half of which would go to Russia.

Unlike what happened after the first world war, after this war no figures were published of the quantity of reparations taken or the form in which they were taken.

Reparations from Rumania

648 728 434 The armistice imposed on Rumania required payment to Russia of reparations in the form of goods amounting in value to 300 million dollars in 1938 world market prices, or 700-800 million dollars today. The reparations were made up as

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follows :—petroleum products, 50 per cent; ships, barges, locomotives and industrial equipment, 32 per cent; agricultural goods and timber 18 per cent. The second group did not make up even as much as 10 per cent of Rumanian exports before the war.

There are no estimates of the proportion of the national income which these reparations represent. The only clue is that given in June 1947 by the vice-Premier, Tatarescu, who gave the proportion as 50 per cent of the total production of Rumanian industry. It would be very unwise to accept this figure uncritically, as it was given on the eve of Tătărescu's conflict with the Communist Party which ended in his expulsion from the Government. Even if it were accurate, this figure would not be very useful as it relates only to industrial production, and not to the whole national product.

In addition to the reparations, Rumania had to give as restitution for goods looted from Russia 100,000 wagon loads of cereals, 260,000 head of cattle, 5,500 wagon loads of sugar, 250 tractors. (Of course, most of the loot taken from Russia by the Rumanians when they occupied it had already been destroyed and lost, and 'restitution' meant taking new products or those in good condition.)

The most important machinery of the Ploesti Oil Refineries was dismantled by the Russian military authorities, and the Rumanians also had to hand over a fifth of the machinery of the textile and metallurgical industries. It must also be remembered that the Russian army lived off the land. There are no statistics of the total cost thus incurred by the country, but it was certainly very great. According to the estimate made in February, 1946, by La Guardia, who was the head of U.N.R.R.A. at the time, the four occupation armies in Austria cost the country 200 million dollars a year. For three years the Russian army in Rumania was not smaller than all the four occupation armies in Austria put together at the beginning of 1946. In view of the complete silence of the Russian authorities about the amount of reparations they took from Rumania, it is impossible to ignore the estimate given by the U.S. delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, Willard L. Thorp, who said on September 23rd, 1946, that Rumania paid in reparations of all kinds 1,050 million dollars and that he estimated that

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648 950 million dollars remained to be paid. E. D. Tappe wrote: 728 'It has been estimated that in fact Roumania, from the armistice to 1 June 1948, paid the U.S.S.R. $1,785 million in goods, etc.; a figure which would represent 84 per cent of Roumania's national income for that period.' (R. R. Betts, editor, *Central and South East Europe, 1945-1948*, London, 1950, pp. 20-21).

Reparations from Hungary

Hungary had to pay reparations in goods amounting to 300 million dollars at 1938 prices, 200 million to U.S.S.R., 50 million to Czechoslovakia and 50 million to Yugoslavia. Industrial goods constituted 83 per cent and agricultural goods 17 per cent of this total. Yet in 1936-7, the proportion of agricultural goods in the total exports of Hungary was 62 per cent, while industrial goods did not make up even a third of all the exports. From this it is clear that Hungarian industry had to make a tremendous effort to supply the reparation goods, especially in view of the terrible devastation her industry suffered in the war, and her own great needs.

648 728 434 An U.N.R.R.A. estimate shows that in 1945, 94 per cent of the working capacity of the metal and engineering industries in Hungary was being used for reparation-goods for Russia. The British parliamentary delegation which visited Hungary in the spring of 1946 estimated that reparation demands amounted to 18 per cent of the national income.

The Hungarian budget for the year 1946-7 set aside for reparations a sum eight times bigger than that allocated to reconstruction (and we must not forget that a large part of the Russian loot is not even included in the budget as it was taken from industries officially in Russian hands). On 23 July, 1946, in a note to the Soviet Government, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow pointed out that half the current industrial production of Hungary was absorbed in meeting Russia's demands. In some industries, including coal, iron and machine production the proportion was 80-90 per cent. At the Peace Conference in Paris in October, 1946, the U.S. representatives claimed that in the year since the armistice about 35 per cent of the national income of Hungary was spent on the costs of Soviet reparations, occupation and requisitions. The British parliamentary delega-

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tion mentioned above estimated the occupation costs at 12 per cent of the national income of Hungary, making with reparations a total of 30 per cent. Now that the Russian Army has been very much reduced and production has passed the pre-war level, the importance of reparations, acquisitions, etc., in the national income has very much declined. According to T. Mende, who was not unsympathetic to the post-war regime in Hungary, they amounted to 7-11 per cent of the national income (*Fortnightly Review*, July, 1948). When Ernö Gerö, the Minister of Finance, introduced the budget for 1949 in the Hungarian parliament on December 15th, 1948, he said that in 1948, 25.4 per cent of the total expenditure went to pay the reparations, while in 1949, 9.8 per cent of the budget would be allocated for this purpose. This reduction is due largely to the fact that Russia cancelled 50 per cent of the remainder of the reparations from July, 1948.

The value of dismantled machinery, locomotives, wagons, etc., taken by the Russian army in Hungary was estimated at 124 million dollars, and the requisitions of the Russian army that lived on the country were very great. According to the American note of 23rd July, 1946, the Soviet forces had up to June, 1945, taken out of Hungary four million tons of wheat, rye, barley, maize and oats (the total pre-war annual production of these grains was a little over 7 million tons). Of the foodstuffs available for the urban population in the second half of 1945 the Soviet army had appropriated nearly all the meat, one-sixth of the wheat and rye, one-quarter of the legumes, nearly three-quarters of the lard, a tenth of the vegetable oils and a fifth of the milk and dairy products. The note added that extensive requisitioning of food was going on as late as April, 1946. And we must not forget that at the same time the food shortage in Hungary was so serious that not more than 850 calories a day per person were provided, which was even fewer than in Germany and Austria. The death rate, especially among babies, reached alarming proportions.

Even countries which were not allies of Germany during the war did not escape the Russian appetite for loot. 60 big industrial enterprises in the Sudeten region and a number of enterprises in other parts of Czechoslovakia were dismantled by the Russian army. In the part of Germany annexed to

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Poland the Russian army dismantled, according to the estimates of the Communist Minister of Industry, Hilary Minc, 25-30 per cent of all the industrial equipment of the area. (Speech delivered in Warsaw on 20th October, 1945). In Old Poland too, the Russian army dismantled machinery, notably in the Lodz and Bialystok textile works.*

Trade Between Russia and her Satellites

An important feature of the foreign trade policy of Russia and her satellites is the tendency towards self-sufficiency or autarchy. The following table illustrates this as far as Russia herself is concerned:

U.S.S.R. FOREIGN TRADE (IN MILLION PRE-1914 GOLD RUBLES)

Year	*Export*	*Import*
1913†	1520.1	1375.0
1924/5..	577.8	723.4
1927/8..	791.6	945.5
1932	574.9	704.0
1937	377.2	294.2
1938	287.8	300.4

The tendency towards economic isolation from the West on the part of the satellites is shown by the following table dealing with the foreign trade of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria: (see top of page 63).

As Yugoslavia did not publish figures of foreign trade for the years 1947 and 1948 it was not possible to take them into consideration in drawing up this table. Otherwise the tendency of these countries to trade mainly among themselves and with Russia and to restrict trade relations with countries independent of Russia would have been even more pronounced.

It would of course be one-sided to conclude that this tendency is entirely the result of the choice of these countries them-

*Incidentally, even backward China was not left untouched by the greed of the Russian bureaucracy. In June, 1946, Edwin Pauley, U.S. Reparations Commissioner, visited Manchuria and inspected 80 per cent of the Japanese war industry. In his report he stated that the Russian removal of equipment was on such a scale as to retard Manchuria's development by a generation and reduce the country to an agricultural economy. The principal items of equipment removed were machine tools and electrical equipment, although in some cases whole plants were completely stripped. Steel production was reduced by more than 50 per cent. Pauley estimated that altogether the machinery dismantled by the Russians was worth 850 million dollars. (*The World Today*, August, 1946). That this was a very heavy burden for Manchuria is clear from the fact that in 1932-1943 the total Japanese investments in Manchuria were evaluated at 5,393 million yen (about 1,200 million dollars).

†In the pre-1914 boundaries.

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CHAPTER I

THE INITIAL SOVIET INTERVENTION: BULGARIA, RUMANIA, HUNGARY

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● 648 661 NAPOLEON'S WORDS, 'Une armée dehors c'est l'État qui voyage', apply very well to the Russian armies which overran the countries of Eastern Europe as a result of the Second World War. If the Russian state had been a liberating democracy where power was in the hands of the people, the entry of the Red Army into the Eastern Europen countries would have inspired their populations to take their fate into their own hands, put an end to the military police dictatorships that terrorized them and establish the full sovereignty of the people. But the policy of the Russian occupation authorities was entirely different. For the first two or three years their primary objective was to preserve as strong an army and police force as possible under the control of the Communist Parties. With this task in mind the Communist leaders skilfully manipulated the pressure of the masses to introduce 'loyal' elements into the army and police and at the same time allied themselves with reactionary, even ex-fascist, heads of the old army and police. The second aim of the Kremlin was to call a halt to any action of the peoples which bore a really democratic and spontaneous character and which might therefore impede the Gleichshaltung of all public life. To achieve this, the same method was adopted of making alliances with the most right-wing, reactionary elements against the authentic Socialist Parties, Peasant Parties and, above all, against the peoples themselves.

A study of political life in the satellite states must begin with an analysis of this policy.

Pre-War Political Regime in Eastern Europe

642 661 728 Before the war, all the countries dealt with (except Czechoslovakia) had lived under a military dictatorship camouflaged

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Polish ones. On 27th March, 1946, the Czech National Council in Morawska-Ostrawa in retaliation forbade the use of the Polish language in Teschen schools which had Polish pupils. (*East Europe*, 3rd April, 1946).

In Conclusion

The policy of keeping national antagonisms alive, especially between Slavs and Teutons, was a liability for the Kremlin after its agents took full control of the satellite countries and after the main pivot of its policy became the struggle against the Western Powers over Germany. Hence since about the end of 1947, when the Cominform was established, the former policy on the national question was dropped, and was replaced by 'internationalism', which is in reality equally the instrument of Russian imperialist national policy. In June, 1948, a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the 'People's Democracies' held in Warsaw, declared its friendship to the German people. In January, 1949, Fierlinger congratulated the German Stalinists (the Socialist Unity Party) on the fact that they were 'proudly professing the old and unadulterated internationalism.' The same theme was repeated time and again by other leaders in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and the other 'People's Democracies.' Stalin himself wrote in a letter to Pieck, president of the 'German Democratic Republic', on October 13th, 1949, that the German and Russians were 'the two peoples possessing the greatest potentialities in Europe to complete great actions of world significance.' Woe betide anyone who should now mention the unity of the 'Slavs' against the 'Teutons.'

The new policy was mainly directed against the satellites who dared to strive for national independence and against the transformation of their countries into Russian gubernias.

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185 tal to an understanding of the problems of Eastern Europe, and much of the political extremism of this region can be traced to the frustrations resulting from this failure.

The most obvious reason for the failure to achieve a European standard, and probably also the most important, has been the persistent necessity of giving priority to national security over human welfare. This problem has, of course, been faced by all modern states, but it has affected the peoples of Eastern Europe to an unusual degree. It would not be too much to say that the insecurity of these states, due more to regional factors than to size, has been the source of most of their difficulties. Of the various solutions that have been attempted, including national opportunism, alliances with great powers, regional pacts, and participation in the League of Nations, none has met the special needs of the situation.

I

186 175 The European wars resulting from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests infected the leaders of the Eastern European peoples with the modern spirit of nationalism and liberalism, but the peace settlement concluded in 1815 did little to satisfy the hopes that had been aroused. The peoples of this region remained under the firm rule of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman dynasties, and before long the process of national liberation came to occupy their principal energies. Of the many national groups in this region, only the Serbians and the Montenegrins achieved any measure of independence before 1815, although the Magyars occupied within the Austrian monarchy a position of special influence. The remaining nationalities in this region had not yet taken the first steps towards independence. The struggle for freedom lasted for a full century, and was a complex process in which the

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with the reconciliation of national differences through federal arrangements and with the broader cultural relationships of peoples with a common linguistic heritage. The most readily identifiable of these proposals are those associated with the Panslav movement, the plans for the reorganization of the Habsburg empire, and the federation schemes of the independent Danubian states None of these projects embraced the entire region of Eastern Europe as it is understood today, but all were inspired by ideas relevant to the problems faced by this region in the twentieth century.

The many-sided Panslav movement in its modern form can be traced to the new interest in Slavic history and languages shown by German scholars at the end of the eighteenth century. A realization of their cultural heritage was soon aroused among Slavic intellectual leaders, and it exerted a powerful stimulus to nationalism among the Poles, Czechs, and Croatians. Certain Polish thinkers in the first hopeful years after the settlement of 1815 favored Polish-Russian cooperation as a basis for Slavic unity, but in a few decades the Poles were seeking the aid of their fellow Slavs in the West against Russian oppression. The map and statistics of Slavic peoples published by the Slovak scholar, Šafařik, in 1842 were widely greeted as a revelation of Slavic strength, and in the revolutionary year of 1848 a congress was held in Prague to rally the peoples of the Slavic world. This rather haphazard gathering revealed the political weakness of Panslavism, but it produced some noble statements of individual and national rights and strengthened the self-confidence of the Slavic peoples as to their contribution to European civilization. In publicizing the views of the non-Russian Slavic leaders at the height of their liberal phase, the congress thus served a purpose. Although Slavic nationalism took precedence over liberalism in the latter half of the century, the ideas expounded at Prague in 1848 were never entirely forgotten.

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186 668 648 Much more was heard about Panslavism between 1848 and 1914, but during this period it was used primarily as a weapon of Russian expansionism. The Slavic movement evolved in Russia early in the century under the name of Slavophilism and, with the founding of a Slavic committee in Moscow in 1857, it entered a Panslav phase. In 1867 non-Russian Slavs were summoned to a congress in Moscow in connection with a Slav ethnographic exhibition, and at this meeting it was not difficult to discern the expansionist tendencies of Russian Panslavism. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1876-78, this movement developed into an outburst of emotional imperialism, and much was said of bringing all Slavs together under Russian rule. European power politics prevented an undue extension of Russian influence in 1878, but Panslavism came to serve Russian policy and was directed increasingly against the Habsburg empire. This trend was particularly evident at the third Panslav Congress held in Prague in 1908. Although the Russian constitutional reforms of 1905-06 made a favorable impression on non-Russian Slavs and brought about some real concessions to the Polish minority, Russian foreign policy never gave up the idea of pushing the Russian frontier to the West. Had the Tsarist regime survived the First World War it would certainly have demanded that large parts of Eastern Europe be annexed or brought into a satellite relationship, and a liberal Russian government might also have favored the Westward expansion of Russian influence.

631 642 The multinational empire of the Habsburgs offered the most challenging problem to the federalists, and the proposals for its constitutional reorganization were varied and ingenious. Of the many ideas arising out of the revolution of 1848, the most comprehensive was the constitution drafted by the freely elected Austrian assembly. After this assembly

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642 many as fifteen federated states, and many hoped that re-
563 organization along such lines would draw towards the empire the Slav and Rumanian peoples on its periphery and thus strengthen its international position. None of these proposals had a serious chance of success, however, and when the empire was finally defeated it disintegrated into its national units.

631 The independent states of Southeastern Europe faced
186 problems that were different from those of the Habsburg
●648 lands, and their alliance and federation schemes were designed to meet the realities of power politics. Once the grandiose plans of the 1848er's had been forgotten, one of these being a proposal for a federation stretching from Poland to Serbia, new schemes were developed around the vigorous Serbian ruler Prince Michael Obrenović. Several agreements were concluded in the 1860's among the Serbian, Montenegrin, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Greek national leaders with the aid of Russian diplomacy, but these efforts were soon overshadowed by the Russian-Turkish conflict. In the long run, the territorial rivalries among the Balkan states proved to be the principal obstacle to their cooperation, and even the successful Balkan Alliance that defeated Turkey in 1912 disintegrated within a year into interallied war. What is significant is that the initiative throughout this period lay with the great powers, and the federation and alliance plans that got beyond the drafting stage were in general those backed by Russia or Austria-Hungary. The principal reality in international relations was the search for security on the part of these two powers that drove them to regard expansion into Southeastern Europe as a guarantee against political humiliation and military defeat. However, the balance was too close for either to succeed in this game, and it was left to a world conflict to clear the stage for a new order.

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liberalism, was opposed from the start to chauvinistic nationalism. All his life he advocated and pursued, to use his own expression, "European and world politics." He attempted to reach an agreement with Germany as to the problem of the German minority within Czechoslovakia and to solve other nationality problems to the satisfaction of all. He hoped that Czechoslovakia would become another Switzerland. 186

Kramář, on the other hand, linked Czechoslovakian national interests with Tsarist Russia. He persistently defended the concept of Czechoslovakia as a "national state" in which the Czechoslovakians would be the leading people and minorities would be delegated to a secondary position. His policy was openly anti-German. He envisaged, in the terms of romantic Pan-Slavism, a great Slav federation headed by a "democratic Russia." Viewing the League of Nations and all international institutions with skepticism, he warned the nation to rely on its own strength. Basically, Kramář's theories were defensive. In practice, they would have served as protection against German imperialism.

A similar difference existed in Rumania between the Bratianu brothers, the leaders of the Liberal Party, and Titulescu, the famous Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Titulescu did not belong to any political party, but his philosophy was definitely liberal. Politically, the Bratianu brothers were liberals in the sense that they defended parliamentary freedom against constitutional monarchy and opposed autocratic ambitions of the prince, later King Carol. Economically, they linked liberalism with the interests of the commercial and banking class. They strove to industrialize the country but, at the same time, they barred foreign capital. In this regard, their economic nationalism was most apparent. 648 186 665

Titulescu, unlike the Bratianu brothers, combined his

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genuine patriotism with sincere internationalism. He was an ardent supporter of the League of Nations. He advocated the principle of collective security. He tried to establish better relations with Soviet Russia. It was he who coined the phrase, "the spiritualization of boundaries." However, he was unable to win sufficient following in the ruling circles, and King Carol, who opposed his broad-minded policy, forced him to resign in 1936.

Poland serves as a clear example of the dominance of nationalism over other political and social trends. In the nineteenth century liberalism attracted many of the Poles who were living in exile, especially those in France. Polish liberals worked enthusiastically with Mazzini in the "Young Europe" movement, and many of them took part unselfishly in the revolution of 1848. However, the great national struggle for the liberation and unification of Poland came to assume first place in the interests of all Polish patriots. Roman Dmowski, a prominent Polish statesman, had been devoted to the principles of liberalism in his youth but, during the national political struggle, he became a passionate nationalist of very conservative leanings. After the re-establishment of Polish independence, liberalism strongly influenced certain small Polish groups, for instance the Democratic and Labor Parties. In the latter, the Catholic influence was strongly felt. Ignace Paderewski, the famous pianist, who contributed greatly to the liberation of Poland in the First World War, belonged to the liberals.

The absence of a pronounced liberal trend and tradition in Poland was undoubtedly one of the reasons why Polish democracy, despite the liberal constitution of 1921, succumbed to the nationalistic pressure of Marshal Pilsudski, who established a semidictatorial regime in 1926 which lasted until the fall of Poland in 1939. The principal defenders of Polish democracy were the Agrarian Party, the Socialists, and the Christian Democrats. Naturally, nation-

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665 cial Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, which party opposed the idea of an independent Poland. During the Bolshevik invasion of Poland in 1920, a Communist government of Poland was created at the rear of the Red Army at a time when the whole Polish nation, united under the leadership of Premier Witos of the Peasant Party and Vice-Premier Daszynski of the Socialist Party, was fighting against the Bolsheviks. In independent Poland after 1921 the Communist Party declared itself in opposition to the independence of Poland and advocated the incorporation of the Republic of Poland into the Soviet Union.

In 1926 the Communists supported Pilsudski's *coup d'état* against the democratic president and government. Only later did they announce that this had been a "mistake of the leadership of the party." When the Comintern attempted to provoke a Communist revolution in Germany in 1932, the Polish Communist Party declared that they favored granting to Germany both Silesia, which had been ceded to Poland after the First World War, and complete control over the Free City of Gdansk (Danzig).

The weakness of the Communist Party of Poland on the eve of the Second World War is proved by the fact that in 1938 it was dissolved by the Comintern on the pretext that it was completely infiltrated by the secret police of the Polish government. After the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact the Polish and German Communists considered the line of division between the German and Soviet spheres of influence to be the future frontier between the Communist Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, Poland, of course, would be completely erased from the map.

• 648 The Soviet invasion of Poland, undertaken in agreement with Nazi Germany, the incorporation into the Soviet Union of almost half of the eastern territory of Poland, and the deportation of a million and half Poles to Russia were pre-

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sented by the Communists as the liberation of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Lithuanian peoples from the yoke of the Polish landlords; Hitler's war against France and England were presented as a battle against Anglo-Saxon imperialism. After the fall of France the Polish Communists, together with those sent from France, assumed a neutral attitude toward the Nazi occupation and terror in Poland. They did not take part in the underground struggle of the Polish nation. They were tolerated by the Gestapo and moved about freely. Only after Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941 did they regain the "spirit of patriotism" and join the Polish underground struggle against Hitler.

Various events greatly discredited the reputation of the Polish Workers' Party (one of the guises under which the Polish Communists masqueraded during the war years). Such events were the massacre of the Polish war prisoners at Katyn, the death of hundreds of thousands of people deported to Soviet forced labor camps in the years 1939-1941, the deportation in 1944 of over 40,000 members of the underground Home Army who had been fighting against the Germans and aiding the entering Red Army, and the return to Poland of a number of Poles who had experienced the Soviet reality. Further discredit was brought to the Polish Workers' Party by the presence of the Communist Lublin Committee. The Committee seized power in Poland with the aid of the Soviet army and the NKVD and nominated as ministers of the government persons who had been in the German concentration camps and had served the Gestapo faithfully.

According to its reports in 1937, the Communist Party of Poland had 6,000 regular members and 12,000 members in the Communist Association of Polish Youth. Experts are of the opinion, however, that these figures were exaggerated by the leadership of the party which was afraid of presenting to Moscow a true report of the extent of its influence. *New*

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one's father, mother, brother, and sister in prisons and in forced labor camps, poisons the hearts of the young, and prepares them for participation in an imperialistic war against the interests of their own countries. 642

Moscow-controlled Communism also serves Soviet imperialism. It is the Soviets that occupied and imposed the Communist dictatorships upon the countries of Eastern Europe. If there had been no Soviet aggression or interference, not one of these countries would have a Communist dictatorship today. The basis for the exploitation of these countries and their systematic economic integration into the framework of the Soviet Union consists of secret trade agreements, so-called technical advisers, and economic plans for each country carefully adjusted to the plans for the Soviet economy. These Moscow-directed devices also determine the quantity of production and trade exchange in accordance with the political and economic objectives of the dictators in the Kremlin. In these countries Soviet generals and lower-ranking officers hold the posts of commanders, and prepare the younger generation for the betrayal of their own national interests and for service to their enemies. 648

For these reasons Communism, manifested as a dictatorship of the proletariat or as People's Democracy, constitutes, in theory and practice, a mortal danger to the existence of freedom, democracy, and peace in the world.

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tain its full strength until after the First World War in the November elections of 1945.

The first international agreement among various peasant groups was reached in 1921, subsequent to the visit of the Bulgarian Premier Stambolisky to Prague. This agreement was between the Bulgarian Agrarian Union and the Czechoslovak Republican Agrarian Party, and was later joined by the Polish Peasant Party. The agreement was, however, of a short duration and of little significance in international relations. In 1923 Stambolisky was overthrown and assassinated, and in 1926 the Prime Minister, Witos, was ousted following the military putsch of Pilsudski.

In 1928 efforts were renewed to achieve an international peasant understanding, and in 1929 the International Agrarian Bureau in Prague was established. The Bureau was presided over by Švehla, and nineteen different peasant organizations from all parts of Europe participated in its work. The Bureau stood for the principles of cooperation, mutual aid, friendship, democracy, and peace. Unfortunately, international conditions did not favor such an association. Except in Czechoslovakia, democratic political movements throughout Eastern Europe were either already outlawed or under heavy pressure of the authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the international agrarian crisis and other unsolved international problems were considerable hindrances to the good will and honest endeavors of the peasant leaders. Nevertheless, the International Agrarian Bureau has contributed considerably to the presentation and defense of the peasant cause in the world. Its activities were discontinued only with the total occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

IV

As might have been expected, the main efforts of the Communists, when they formed the People's Democracies

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First World War, was the only well-developed industrial region and provided the foundations of the industrial economy of Czechoslovakia. Poland and Hungary had some valuable industries which aided their development considerably. In the other states, industrialization made slow progress and often operated on an unsound basis. Many plants were erected, the products of which were not related to the needs of the respective countries. National welfare was often neglected and industries were built for the enrichment of a few individuals. Not even mining was efficient. Mines were exhausted or were reopened mainly on the basis of sudden export needs and with no thought that the industries might convert the mineral raw materials into consumer goods. Hungary, where bauxite was sold to Germany and aluminum was repurchased at a high price, offers an excellent example.

Mining, metallurgy, heavy industry, and textiles were favored but they were not related to the purchasing power of the masses or to the production of raw materials. Because of the low production of textile raw material, large textile plants were run on imports. Cereals, livestock, and other agricultural goods were exported to balance the budget. Thus, much of the capital had to be spent on transportation expenses. The attention paid to agricultural industry was insufficient despite the fact that mineral raw materials, agricultural products, and timber were assets upon which a satisfactory program of industrialization could have been based.

The causes for this situation are to be found in the political instability of Eastern Europe and in the lack of sufficient skills and resources. It was a region of wars and insecurity where little nations faced each other with mistrust and fought each other as fiercely as they did the outside powers. Industrial policy between the two world wars was dependent on power politics. The policy of economic self-sufficiency, or autarky, was engendered by nationalistic as-

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pirations mostly in order to develop a modern industry capable of meeting war needs.

The assumption that work invested in industrial development would improve economic conditions was a decisive factor in influencing states to industrialize. This assumption was particularly valid in regions with climatic extremities and little arable land. Some of the means used to foster industrialization were technical education, customs, embargoes, tax exemptions, monopolies, favorable credit policies, and provisions protecting the joint interests of domestic industries. The assembly line system, as influenced by the United States, was started in the industrial sector in the '30's.

Branches of industry requiring specialized skill were developed mainly in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but they did not attract many from the surplus peasant population which still preferred unskilled jobs. The competition, such as it was, for unskilled jobs resulted in a low wage level. Therefore, the increase in purchasing power was gradual. Peasant poverty and the lack of skill and capital were the fundamental problems facing industrialization programs and the new governmental economic policies.

The general poverty was further increased by the fact that the small Eastern European countries were debtor states. The solvency of Czechoslovakia was dependent on the export of industrial goods, while other states depended upon agricultural exports or, as in Rumania, upon mineral raw materials and lumber as well as on agricultural goods. Foreign debts, incurred before and after the First World War, weighed heavily on the budgets of the individual countries. Only one half of the debts were repaid during the interwar period. Foreign loans were given too often on the basis of political considerations. The boundaries erected by the 1920 peace treaties had already broken up natural economic and geographic areas, and the disproportionate lending policies of foreign powers hindered the uniform economic development of East-

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ern Europe. The individual states became more and more antagonistic and trade within the Eastern European area often took a course contrary to the requirements of reasonable economic policies. Free trade, cherished in the first postwar years, was soon abandoned for the sake of a policy of protective tariffs. Customs, duties, and foreign exchange restrictions to prevent speculation, were introduced to protect economic development and strength.

Both "economic nationalism" and "small power imperialism" were features characteristic of this area in the period between the wars. When the economic position of the new states in the '20's is compared with the situation prior to the First World War, the problems of these states emerge clearly. The economic well-being of the old Austro-Hungarian empire lay in the regional character of its economic organization, which depended mostly on a coordinated internal market and a natural division of labor between the component parts of the empire. Although it was a social and cultural mosaic, the empire was organized in such a manner as to take advantage of the regional distribution of natural resources and the differing skills of the various populations.

The peace treaties ending the First World War, while meeting the political aspirations of various nationalities, did not provide a satisfactory solution to the economic problems of the region, and the newly created states were divided by serious political and economic differences. Political animosity soon led to economic warfare, and self-sufficiency, the driving motivation of the new states, precluded any real possibility of economic cooperation. The world depression of the early '30's led to the final economic and psychological collapse of Eastern European stability and opened the door wide to German economic penetration and the eventual conquest of the region.

The foreign trade of the Eastern European countries in the years 1919-1944 was far smaller than it should have

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563 peoples. The accompanying table shows the distribution of languages in Eastern Europe in the interwar period as established by the League of Nations.

162 197 Distribution of Principal Languages in Eastern Europe about 1930 *

(APPROXIMATE FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

Language	*Albania*	*Bulgaria*	*Czechoslovakia*	*Hungary*	*Poland*	*Rumania*	*Yugoslavia* **
Russian	—	12	—	—	139	451	25
Ukrainian	—	—	569	1	4,442	641	31
White Russian	—	—	—	—	1,697	—	—
Polish	—	—	100	—	21,993	38	18
Czechoslovakian	—	—	9,757	108	38	43	138
Serbo-Croatian	—	—	6	55	—	48	10,257
Slovene	—	—	—	5	—	—	1,159
Bulgarian	—	5,275	—	3	—	364	73
German	—	4	3,318	479	741	761	602
Rumanian	13	16	14	16	—	13,181	276
Greek	37	10	—	—	—	21	—
Albanian	984	—	—	—	—	4	524
Gypsy	—	81	33	8	—	101	54
Hungarian	—	—	720	8,001	—	1,555	557
Turkish	30	622	—	—	—	288	180
Others	—	58	213	12	2,866	561	41
Totals	1,064	6,078	14,730	8,688	31,916	18,057	13,935

* Based on Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (Geneva: League of Nations), Table 17, pp. 228-29.

** A. Meillet, *Les Langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (Paris, 1928), p. 426, estimated that Macedonian was spoken by 628,000 in Yugoslavia in 1926, but in the official census this group was not distinguished from those speaking Serbo-Croatian.

563 ●648 The peacemakers were conscious of the problem that had been created, and in order to make certain that the different linguistic groups would receive fair treatment it was required of these states that they subscribe to carefully worded provisions for the protection of their minorities. These pro-

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visions were included in the peace treaties with Hungary and Bulgaria, and the states that had been created or enlarged as a result of the war assumed similar obligations. The provisions for the protection of minorities were concerned with the use of language in schools and courts, the practice of religion, and the equitable administration of social security. Their implementation by the respective governments was supervised by a Minorities Commission in the League of Nations, and a system of petitions was established for bringing injustices to the attention of the League. Although the principles underlying this system represented a great advance over pre-war practice, the efforts at implementation failed to meet the needs of the situation. In many cases the minorities continued to be discriminated against, and even when they were not, nationalist movements sponsored by neighboring countries often proved irresistible. As a result, the problem of minorities became one of the fundamental sources of political instability in Eastern Europe.

Another unfavorable factor was that richer families sent their children to foreign universities, especially to France, Germany, and Great Britain, while there was little student exchange among the Eastern European countries themselves. Educated people knew a great deal about Western Europe, but much less about neighboring states and peoples. Naturally, this was even more so among nations which had been enemies in the First World War and which now fiercely condemned their citizens if they praised the culture or progress of a former enemy. However, this situation was not unique to this region. It was characteristic of Europe as a whole and, like the development of nationalism and industry, moved from West to East.

Many of Eastern Europe's difficulties stemmed from the instability of its political life. Governments changed constantly and political parties fought each other to the last breath. Due to the many changes of government, an unwhole-

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general were slow to learn and to develop their abilities. 578
They did not cooperate with regulations and laws even when such were to their own benefit, an attitude that stems from many centuries of oppression.

IV

It is difficult to say what turn the development of Eastern 648 ●
Europe might have taken if, after gaining full freedom and independence in the twentieth century, the countries of this region had been given the chance to progress in a peaceful era. The countries of Eastern Europe, immediately after recovering from the traumatic depression of the 1930's, were confronted with German and Russian imperialism without even a chance to settle down for a period of healthy evolution. Unhappily, the Western European powers, after their unfortunate appeasement policy towards Hitler which completely confused the Eastern European nations, joined hands too tightly with communist Russia. The Eastern European states, semidemocratic, semidictatorial, balancing between bankruptcy and future recovery, between socialism and aristocratic-bourgeois traditions, were a brutally realistic mirror of Europe's modern revolution.

Germany used all means possible to influence and to domi- 648
nate the area. Basing its actions upon meticulous studies of 439
the history, geography, politics, economics, social life, and cultural habits of the respective countries, Germany gained influence through the use of economic penetration, anti-semitism, social-revolutionary propaganda, antibolshevism, and diplomacy. The Eastern European states could not very well defend themselves against such brilliantly conducted infiltration. Nor could their economics develop satisfactorily when American, British, French, and Swiss businessmen were completely disinterested in trade and investment in Eastern Europe since the prospects for profit were not great in that

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area. It is unjust to accuse the Eastern European states of favoring Germany when this country alone was willing to trade with them and did not demand hard currency payments. Germany bought large quantities of Eastern European products and forced the sellers to buy from her various articles, including gadgets, luxury goods, and many other products, the prices of which were beyond the purchasing power of the buyers.

Antisemitic movements in Eastern Europe often received aid in the form of money from Nazi Germany which practice increased dependence upon that country. Through the various Nazi-supported parties in almost every country and through fifth column organizations, the Germans instigated conflicts between the ruling classes and the dissatisfied social elements. At the same time antibolshevik propaganda was strongly and successfully supported by German diplomacy.

Czechoslovakia, in 1938, was the first to lose her independence. Poland fell in 1939, and Yugoslavia followed in 1941. The years 1939 through 1944 were truly critical for Eastern Europe. The German-Russian imperialistic pincers tightened steadily. Nazi Germany won easy diplomatic victories over the Western European powers whose conciliatory policies were astounding. Even more astounding was their sudden turn to anti-German propaganda and war. Squeezed between the arbitrary policy of the Western powers and the expanding German and Soviet giants, the Eastern European nations had no other choice than to muddle through. Apprehensively watching an alliance of giants and often impressed by the achievements of these powers, they tried to appease them, aid them, or fight them.

Peace economy was turned into war economy. This decreased unemployment, and war losses decreased it even further. The most active age group, already reduced by the slump in birth rate after the First World War, was thinned even more. Youth, accustomed to tackling problems in terms

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produce litt'e, if anything, and the vast apparatus of standing armed forces, of police and poli ical supervision, of party machinery and propaganda, does not create wealth but consumes it. The onetime waste of unemployment has been partly supplanted by the waste of the immense state machinery of control and compulsion inherent in all totalitarian systems and particularly odious under Communism.

In addition to this costly political overhead, there are three other burdens to the national economies of these countries. One is the cost of planning both on a national scale and in minute detail, an economically unlikely proposition, resulting in duplication of work, omissions, bottlenecks, and other forms of economic confusion. This has been one of the main reasons why the Yugoslav Five Year Plan has never been fully realized. This type of waste can only be eliminated very gradually, if at all. The second type of waste is directly due to Communism. In the free world, private property is fairly generally respected and cared for by its owners and by the public at large. Public property, being the exception rather than the rule, also enjoys respect and cases of vandalism are few. In Eastern Europe, state property is the rule, and very few people give it proper respect. The Communists are aware of this general neglect and the ensuing injury to the economy but believe that in time society will be taught to take care of what is defined as people's wealth. However, during thirty-five years of Communism in Russia, there has been little progress in this direction. The third burden on the state economy is a specific feature of the countries of Eastern Europe. All of them have to pay heavy tribute to the Russian big brother. Russia exploits the captive nations in many ways: by reparations in kind, mixed companies, trade agreements, high prices for imports from Russia and low prices for exports to Russia, maintenance costs for Soviet troops, high salaries for Russian experts and advisers, and the like. These nations cannot express themselves on this topic, but

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there is overwhelming evidence that they are aware of being fleeced by the Russians to the extent of hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

III

One of the main results of the existence of the Iron Curtain is the gradual integration of Eastern Europe into the Soviet economy. Under the present circumstances, Soviet Russia lays hands on many of the raw materials and industrial goods, both capital and consumer, that are put out by the captive countries. The realization of its economic plans depends in no small way upon these goods. The industrialization of this area also depends on imports and could not proceed at its present rapid rate without the importation of machinery and, more important, of raw materials from the Soviet Union, in particular from the Ukraine. These countries are meeting with restrictions on the importation of so-called strategic goods from the United States and from some other Western countries. However, even if there were no such restrictions, these countries would have difficulty in paying for imported goods, since they do not produce sufficient surpluses of goods that interest several of the most important Western markets, for instance, the United States, the British dominions, France, and possibly Western Germany. On the other hand, the capacity of the Soviet Union and China to consume goods produced by the states of Eastern Europe is practically limitless.

For all these reasons, in addition to political expediency, trade between this area and the Soviet Union has been increasing rapidly from year to year. Were it not for Soviet iron and manganese ore, colored metals, phosphate rock and sulphur, cotton, wool, and, in certain parts of the area, coke and pig iron, many metallurgical, chemical, and textile plants in the area would have to close down. Indeed, they will do

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reflect that, had their country had a sufficient industrial basis in 1939 to equip ten armored divisions for which she had enough trained manpower, her loss of independence and many other events in modern history could have been prevented.

The present industrialization of Eastern Europe is gradually eliminating this handicap of the past. To be sure, the increase of the industrial potential of these countries lies in the interest of the Soviet Union in its own military preparations. The men in the Kremlin may dispose as they wish of this area's industrial plants together with all its human and material resources with the single exception of the spirit of its peoples. From the standpoint of both the immediate and long-range interests of the West, any addition to the wealth or the strength of Eastern Europe is unwelcome so long as the latter remains a part of the Soviet bloc. These countries are of course aware of this situation, but they have to think also about their future. They hope that one day the Iron Curtain will be lifted and they know that at that time they will need all their new industrial wealth in order to cease being an area of social unrest and a target for exploitation by powerful neighbors as well as a hotbed for world wars. Nobody has disputed the right of Russia to evolve into an industrial power. No one can expect the countries of Eastern Europe to relinquish their hopes of freedom and their rights to prosperity which, in the light of their past, are linked to the modernization of their economic structure. Wendell Willkie said during the last war that "Only the productive can be strong, and only the strong can be free." His words apply to all nations alike. The nations of Eastern Europe are potential allies of the West. Those who earnestly desire a better world should bear in mind that the lasting interests of these friendly nations transcend their temporary position as Russia's enforced associates.

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9 International Relations Between the Wars

HENRY L. ROBERTS

I

000 The most striking aspect of the constellation of states in Eastern Europe after 1918 was that it should have come into existence at all. It is not that these states were "artificial" creations. It is rather that the appearance at that time of a zone of independent nation-states, from the Baltic to the Aegean, was largely the consequence of the simultaneous collapse, through war and revolution, of both Germany and Russia, an eventuality not anticipated in 1914. One cannot say what would have been the picture in Eastern Europe had either Germany or Russia emerged victorious, but certainly it would have been very unlike that which actually came about.

648 186 The continued independence of the area was dependent upon preventing either of the two great powers from gaining ascendency or from working with the other to control the non-Germanic and non-Russian peoples of the area, as they had done during much of the nineteenth century. This was a common burden of all the states of Eastern Europe after 1918. Unfortunately, it was almost their only real point of unity. The other unifying factor was that they were pre-

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dominantly agrarian states, rather uncomfortably situated between a highly industrialized West and a "proletarian" U.S.S.R.

In nearly all other respects the area is marked by wide diversity. The boundaries between the different linguistic and cultural groups, often not clear, were generally not congruent either with natural boundaries or with the frontiers as they emerged after the First World War. In consequence, there were a series of territorial controversies which, in keeping the region at odds with itself, were of tragic significance. To take a few of the more critical examples: Vilna was contested by Poland and Lithuania, and Teschen by Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hungary and Czechoslovakia disputed the borders of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia. Transylvania was an issue between Rumania and Hungary. The Dobrogean quadrilateral divided Rumania and Bulgaria, and the latter was in turn in conflict with Yugoslavia over Macedonia and with Greece over access to the Aegean. In addition, of course, there were the unresolved issues involving the great powers which bordered Eastern Europe: Danzig, Upper Silesia, and Bessarabia, to name only three sore points.

Accompanying and to some extent a consequence of these differences was the constant controversy over minorities. It is unjust to say that the Versailles treaties, in breaking up the old multi-national empires, merely reproduced the old nationality conflicts within the new components. On the contrary, many more people than before lived within states controlled by their own nationals. Yet the solution was far from perfect. The very establishment of the national principle as the basis for the state carried with it a strong impulse to consolidate and coordinate—with resulting pressures on the minorities. Certainly the mood of strong nationalism, often accompanied by an inner lack of self-confidence, frequently led to unfair treatment of minorities. One must admit, nevertheless, that the multi-national principle, as represented in

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actual fact by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire, did not in the years before 1914 seem to offer any real framework for constructive development. To be sure, there were many projects for the reorganization of these states, but on close examination they reveal little basis in reality.

In addition to the frontier and minorities problems, there was also the phenomenon of economic nationalism. Insofar as the restrictive effects of economic nationalism, especially the high tariffs, added to the difficulties of the region, they were symptomatic rather than a basic cause of trouble. In most instances, economic nationalism developed as a natural, if not particularly enlightened, reaction to the fact that these new states were under strong incentive to strengthen their economies as rapidly as possible. Because of many political uncertainties, they tended to proceed along the path of economic nationalism: "By ourselves alone" as the Rumanian liberals used to say. In this, of course, the behavior of the Eastern European states was not unlike that of the larger states, but the results in this area were often preposterous. For example, the chopping up of the Danube basin into a number of different tariff areas certainly was not a rational action.

Before turning to the development of international relations in this period, one further observation should be made. In comments on the vicissitudes of this part of the world, one encounters two opposing views. One is expressed by the phrase "the Balkanization of Europe," which carries with it the implication that the stability of Europe was perennially upset by the bickering, intrigue, and petty rivalries of the small states of Eastern Europe. The other view is that the Eastern European states were behaving as well as they could under constant subjection to the machinations of the great powers who tried to use them as pawns. Both views are misleading. During the interwar period, the wisdom and stupidity

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000their opposition to German pressure on Austria, but later Italy usually sided with Germany, although not without certain uneasy doubts.

In general, then, France was the one great power really committed to support the *status quo* in Eastern Europe, and France, as it proved, was not enough.

• 648 Within the area itself, all the Eastern European states had a common interest in avoiding great power control, an interest whose object became tragically apparent when the whole area was dominated by Hitler after 1941. The First World War had brought into being several formations or groupings of the Eastern European states. However, the beneficiaries of the war must be distinguished from the losers. Some states were new creations, or had greatly added to their prewar territory. Others—Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria—had been in the camp of the Central Powers. Bulgaria's losses date both from the First World War and from the Second Balkan War of 1913, in which it had lost territory to Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. In the case of Hungary, a strong case could be made that it, too, was a successor state, but as a defeated power it was obliged to sign the Treaty of Trianon. One can, perhaps, justify each of Hungary's territorial losses to Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, on either ethnic, economic, or strategic grounds —though not all three at once—but the cumulative effect of all these detachments was such as to make the Hungarian cry, "No, no, never," a justifiable response. This meant, of course, that in Danubian and Balkan Europe, there was a profound disunity, which served to block efforts at extended common action.

North of the Carpathians a somewhat different situation prevailed. Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland were all beneficiaries of the new settlement. Unhappily, Vilna and Teschen provided, or at least symbolized, disputes which inhibited common action in that region.

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III

Despite this disunity, important efforts were made to bring greater cohesiveness and unity to Eastern Europe. Of these the most important was the Little Entente, formed through a series of treaties between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania in 1920-1921. The sponsors of these treaties had as a broader and eventual aim the establishment of a great entente extending, as expressed by Take Ionescu, the Rumanian statesman, from the Baltic to the Aegean. Nevertheless, the immediate and specific objective was more limited: the defense of the territorial settlement of the Treaty of Trianon against Hungary and opposition to any effort to bring back the Habsburgs. In the case of the Yugoslav-Rumanian treaty, provision was also made for the defense of the Treaty of Neuilly against Bulgaria.

In the course of time a fairly extensive philosophy of the meaning of the Little Entente was formulated. The Entente became active in the League of Nations, of which the Entente members were ardent supporters. By 1926, the Entente became linked with France through a series of understandings and agreements. The statutes of the Entente were gradually enlarged to include agreements for the settlement of mutual disputes by arbitration, and later, in 1933-34, for the creation of a Permanent Council, an Economic Council, and a permanent secretariat. All these steps were aimed at coordinating and unifying the foreign policies of the three members and at increasing their efficacy in the world as a whole.

Seen in retrospect, the Little Entente had certain shortcomings. It was directed against Hungary and, despite various efforts, the rift between the Entente and Hungarian revisionism was never overcome. Perhaps too great emphasis was placed on Hungary which was, after all, a very secondary power in these years, and probably weaker militarily than any

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● 648 single Entente power. At the same time, the treaties had nothing to say about meeting threats arising from great powers. There was no immediate community of interests in this regard, since each of the three members was potentially threatened by a different great power: Czechoslovakia by Germany, Rumania by Soviet Russia, and Yugoslavia by Italy. The Czechoslovakians had no direct conflicts with the Russians, the Rumanians had no direct conflicts with the Germans, and neither were at odds with Italy. This meant that the Entente was overprotected from internal, but underprotected from external, danger. This flaw became evident in the later half of the 1930's.

To the south of the Little Entente, a Balkan grouping also came into being. The idea of a Balkan confederation was not a new one. Programs for achieving South Slav unity had been in the air from the time the Balkan states began to emerge from Turkish control. But a series of quarrels, especially concerning Macedonia, had always blocked these efforts. In the early 1930's a number of Balkan conferences were held. While significant achievements could be listed—the creation of machinery for the settlement of disputes, projects for intellectual cooperation, and even a project for a customs union—these achievements were largely procedural and technical. They did not extend to real political innovations. The Balkan Entente, formed in 1934, comprised Greece, Turkey, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, but not Bulgaria, which was not willing to accept the premise of no territorial revision. The Bulgarian position was not as intense as the Hungarian, and in certain political groups there was a real desire for South Slav unity. But it should be noted that a reconciliation on such lines would have had a doubtful reception in such a state as Rumania which was very sensitive about being an island of Latinity in a sea of Slavs, as the phrase went. The terms of the Balkan Entente provided for defense against a Balkan aggressor only, not against a great power. The Balkan

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Entente was linked by two of its members to the Little Entente, but one cannot say that this association measurably increased the unity of Eastern Europe.

An extension of the Little Entente to the north was blocked by the Polish-Czechoslovakian conflict, by Poland's unwillingness to enter a grouping directed against its traditional Hungarian friends, and by a certain Polish reluctance to become committed to the preservation of the *status quo* south of the Carpathians. The one real link here was the Polish-Rumanian joint defense agreement which, unlike the other arrangements, was directed against a great power, the Soviet Union.

As for the Baltic region, no great achievement can be recorded. Finland tended to orient itself toward the Scandinavian states. Poland and Lithuania did not even establish diplomatic relations until 1938, and then only under a Polish ultimatum. There was an alliance between Latvia and Estonia in 1923, and in 1934 a modest Baltic Entente covering the three Baltic states was signed, but it was not of great moment.

In general, looking from north to south, one sees the appearance of a number of groups aiming at the preservation of stability and independence in the area. Nevertheless, there were ominous gaps between and within the groups, and no sufficient measures for threats from without. The key connections, of course, were the Little Entente and the French ties with it and with Poland.

Apart from these alignments, which stood for the *status quo* and the Versailles system, there were certain other combinations which should be mentioned. Italy, which was in competition with France, attempted to counter the French ties with the Little Entente by the Rome Protocols of 1934 with Austria and Hungary—a clear example of the dangers of the reciprocal interplay of great and small power differences. Poland, under Colonel Beck, had some rather ambi-

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tious plans for achieving a bridge to the West via the Scandinavian states, and to create a great Baltic bloc. But the Scandinavian states, at this time, were not entering into the power combinations of Central and Eastern Europe, and the project never got beyond some goodwill tours. Finally, in 1938, Beck, with Ciano, discussed the formation of a Rome-Belgrade-Budapest-Warsaw axis, with the intent of checking German eastward expansion which was now clearly in the offing. But it was very late in the day for such a project, and it never came to any practical fulfillment.

Perhaps the most extensive, although abortive, effort to increase the security of Eastern Europe, this time in conjunction with the great powers, was the French attempt to achieve a so-called Eastern Locarno agreement. The states of Eastern Europe had been understandably disturbed by the Locarno agreements of 1925 which had seemed to settle, by international guarantee, Germany's western frontiers but which had done this at the cost of inviting German revisionism on its eastern frontiers. In 1934-35 France tried to achieve an agreement on the Eastern territorial settlement; Germany, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states were to be signatories with France as a guarantor of the treaty. Germany, however, refused to participate. This led to a Polish refusal to underwrite what would then have been an anti-German combination. Eventually the project was reduced to the French-Soviet-Czechoslovakian mutual assistance agreements of 1935, which were clearly something other than a regional organization.

Apart from these various diplomatic combinations, certain other efforts were made to increase the unity of Eastern Europe. Of some interest in this respect is the International Agrarian Bureau, also known as the Green International, founded by leaders of peasant or agrarian parties in a number of Eastern European states in 1921. In its heyday in the 1920's it included peasant parties from Czechoslovakia, Bul-

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garia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Austria, Switzerland, Poland, France, the Baltic States, and Finland. The literature of the late 1920's concerning Eastern Europe shows that this peasantist or agrarian movement was widely regarded as the hope of the future. Here was a movement representing a basic common interest of the area and transcending national frontiers.

Unhappily the promise in this movement was never realized, and the movement eventually collapsed. The agrarian parties were not able to dominate the domestic political scene in most of these countries, and the whole position of agriculture was undermined by the advent of the depression in 1929. A governmental effort to organize some defense of agricultural interests was made in 1930 in the form of an agrarian bloc, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. At a number of international conferences and at the League of Nations, this movement attempted to coordinate economic policy and to gain preferential treatment for agricultural exports from the industrial states of Western Europe. This effort achieved nothing tangible, and under the lash of the depression, these states were driven to a policy of *sauve qui peut*.

IV

The depression and the rise of Hitler were undoubtedly the major factors in starting the breakup of whatever cohesion had been achieved in the calmer years of the 1920's. For a time, to be sure, even after Hitler came to power, the Eastern European states showed a good deal of ability to act together. The Little Entente, together with Poland, was largely effective in protesting against the Four-Power Pact of 1933. The extension of the powers of the Little Entente in 1934 and the creation of the Balkan Entente in the same year also showed a positive response to the new dangers. In the false calm of 1934 a number of voices could be heard saying that

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• 648 at last the Balkans had come of age and were no longer a source of European trouble. This was partly true, but somewhat irrelevant.

Unhappily, the breakdown was not far off. In 1934 Poland signed its non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. Poland was clearly in a very difficult position and it is not hard to understand the attraction of an offer which seemed to promise an alleviation of the German revisionist campaign. The pact served, however, to increase the disunity of Eastern Europe. Although it was the basic intention of Polish policy to maintain an even balance between its two great neighbors, this agreement served in effect to bring Poland increasingly to a position paralleling that of Germany. This tendency was heightened when Czechoslovakia, by its 1935 pact with the Soviet Union, came to look eastward for support. Here again the local Polish-Czechoslovakian conflict became involved in a more extensive and dangerous diplomatic issue.

The other states whose interests lay in the preservation of the *status quo* also engaged in an increasing amount of fence-mending. The Stoyadinovíc government in Yugoslavia moved to improve its relations with Germany. In Rumania, Titulescu, who had favored a cautious *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union, was replaced in 1936, and King Carol tried with increasing difficulty to follow a policy of balance. This was a hard job since he was being pressed domestically by the growing threat of the pro-German Iron Guard.

The events that led to the disintegration of Eastern Europe are too familiar to require more than the listing of a few of the more important: The failure of France and Britain to challenge the German remilitarization of the Rhineland left Hitler relatively free to turn eastward. The formation of the Axis and Mussolini's withdrawal of support from Austria paved the way for the Anschluss. And finally, of course, the Munich crisis was followed by the breakup of Czechoslovakia, in which Hungary and Poland participated. Certainly

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the ultimate responsibility for the collapse of Czechoslovakia must rest with the Western powers, yet it is conceivable that had the Eastern European states, above all Poland and Czechoslovakia, stood together, it might have been possible to stiffen the French spine at this fatal juncture. From Munich the road led to the crises of 1939, and eventually to the German-Soviet pact of August, which spelt the end of independent Eastern Europe.

Germany's economic penetration of Eastern Europe after 1933 was not a primary factor in the breakup of this region. While the reality of the penetration cannot be denied, for it meant much more than foisting aspirin and cameras on the Eastern European states, its importance may be questioned. This penetration did not really impair the political independence of these states until after the diplomatic situation had deteriorated greatly, and some of the German trade agreements which really bound the economies of the area were a result rather than a cause of the shift in the balance of power.

One may ask at this point about the influence of the domestic political and social problems of Eastern Europe on international relations. A good deal has been written about the failure of parliamentary and constitutional regimes in Eastern Europe, and their replacement by authoritarian regimes. Some have concluded from this that there was a tendency on the part of these regimes to gravitate toward Hitler and to refuse to have anything to do with the Soviet Union at a time when Litvinov was loudly calling, at the League and elsewhere, for collective security against aggression.

The relationship between foreign and domestic policy is always a complex and debatable one. In the case of Eastern Europe, however, one must steer a course between two inadequate interpretations of this relationship, which may be called the Popular Frontist and the Retrospective Vindica-

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tionist. The first, which is roughly the one described above, is not tenable. Documentary evidence which has appeared since the war makes it difficult to consider the Popular Front as anything but an instrument of Communist advance. It is quite evident that the Communists were not renouncing their ultimate aims either in Eastern Europe or elsewhere. It is also clear that the U.S.S.R. was not seriously prepared to stand up for the collective security it was calling for, although admittedly it was never required to do so. At the time of Munich, the Germans were not particularly anxious about the danger from the Soviet side. Moreover, it appears from the diplomatic memoirs of the Eastern European statesmen that they tended, as a group, to view the Soviet danger in the traditional terms of the "colossus of the East" as a perennial threat, whether or not it had a Communist regime. Thus their suspicions of the U.S.S.R. cannot be reduced to a reflection of the "class conflict."

Regarding the second interpretation, it should be recognized that there was a special antipathy to the U.S.S.R. on the part of the Eastern European countries, which led to certain misjudgments of the relative dangers existing in the 1930's. Pilsudski, for example, after ordering an intelligence survey of his two powerful neighbors in 1933-34, concluded that, while both were dangerous from the Polish point of view, in the short run the Soviet Union was more likely than Germany to follow an erratic and aggressive course. This proved to be a miscalculation. One nevertheless gains the impression that a similar mood was prevalent in the diplomatic circles of Eastern Europe. This served to reduce the area of maneuverability in the final crisis and did not afford any way out of the tragic impasse of 1939.

During the war years, Eastern Europe disappeared as a region of independent states. Germany and the Soviet Union divided most of the area into spheres of influence and, with the German attack on Russia in June 1941, the whole region

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fell directly or indirectly under German domination. There was, nevertheless, some continuity. Among the governments-in-exile, the struggle for future independence was clear and explicit. Likewise, among the German satellites, there was a persistent attempt to maintain a degree of independence. The extent of the resistance of Hungary to Hitler has come out quite clearly since the war in the memoirs of the statesmen involved. Even such an active and cooperative Eastern European satellite leader as Marshal Antonescu seems finally to have placed his hopes on a German defeat from the West, while he continued in the effort to keep Russia at bay in the East.

It should also be noted, however, that the old frictions did not disappear. One major motive for Antonescu's entering the war, apart from the desire to recover Bessarabia, was his wish to put himself in a favorable position vis-à-vis Germany to press for the return of Northern Transylvania, which had been lost to Hungary in 1940. This old conflict continued unabated throughout the war.

It is worth noting, finally, the importance to Eastern Europe of the fact that Russia did not emerge victorious in the First World War. We do not know what such a Russian regime would have been like or how it would have treated Eastern Europe, but we do have some clues from the secret treaties and arrangements made by the Entente powers during the war. Poland, including the German and Austrian sections, would probably have been incorporated into Russia. By an agreement in 1915 Russia was to obtain Constantinople and the Turkish territory in Europe. In a Russian-French exchange of notes in February 1917, Russia was given complete freedom to determine its own western frontiers. Thus the intrusion of Russia far into Eastern Europe was a likelihood in 1914-18, and was staved off in 1919-21 only to reappear as a reality in 1945 under new and decidedly more dangerous circumstances. In this sense there had been

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186 liberation struggle to admiration for communism itself, and
208 so to the Soviet Union.

Thus the Soviet myth—the supposed victories of the ideals of social reform of the Bolshevik revolution over police and bureaucratic persecutions of the Tsars—went hand in hand with the ties of race of the old Slav mystique. But by 1946, the emphasis of Pan-Slavism shifted to a position reminiscent of the "Slavophile" doctrines of the nineteenth century. Danilevski's prophecies in his *Russia and Europe* (1869) were in the process of realization. Using the language of peace and love, which seemed to him two typical Slav qualities, he had predicted a federation under Russian leadership, as the outcome of a war between Russia and Europe. The federation would consist of Russia (including Galicia, northern Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine), the territory of the South Slavs with Istria and Trieste, Rumania, the Czech and Slovak territories, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, and Constantinople, as well as sections of Turkey. Many of his prophecies, which at the time undoubtedly seemed fantastic, have come true in the last five years.

● 648 The triumph of Russia over Eastern Europe set the tone
186 for the great Slav Congress which was held in Belgrade on December 8, 1946. That the permanent headquarters of the Pan-Slav movement was to be located in this city, as was the headquarters of the Cominform newspaper—*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*—is hardly surprising. The speeches and the program of the Congress proclaimed that the Slav peoples lead the world both in the struggle against war, for peace and democracy, and in cultural achievements. Finally, the Congress created the usual organizational methods to further Slavic cultural cooperation. A serious blow was dealt by Tito's defection from the orbit to this attempt at empire building through the Pan-Slav idea, but nevertheless the flow of propaganda continued.

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II

The reality of Soviet political control over Eastern Europe, implemented by the Communist parties in each country, has been supplemented by a network of political and economic treaties. During the period between December 12, 1943 and April 6, 1948, the Soviet Union concluded "treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" with each of its present satellites—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria—as well as with the then satellite Yugoslavia and with a neutralized Finland. Each instrument is a treaty of military alliance defining the *casus foederis* which brings it into operation and prohibits the satellite from joining in coalitions directed against the Soviet Union.

The conclusion of these treaties formalized an already existing reduction of the status of the Eastern European countries in the field of international policy to the rank of camp-followers of the Soviet Union. The treaties were only a screen behind which political control, military planning and rearmament were exercised. The Eastern European satellites are linked with each other by a network of seventeen bilateral treaties bearing the same title, concluded between March 18, 1946 and April 16, 1949. It seems that thereafter no further alliances were signed inside the Soviet bloc.

After Tito's revolt and excommunication in June 1948, the Soviet Union and its satellites unilaterally denounced their alliances with Yugoslavia during September and October 1949 in violation of the pertinent treaty provisions. Nevertheless the network of the Soviet bloc was almost completed after Yugoslavia's defection by the conclusion of four other inter-satellite alliances. The present state of the structure must naturally be evaluated in the light of the Yugoslav gap, of Tito's still precarious ties with the West, and of

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● 648 the recent Ankara treaty of friendship and collaboration of February 28, 1953 linking Yugoslavia with Greece and Turkey against "non-provoked aggression" from the north.

A detailed analysis and comparison of the provisions of these treaties as a method of arriving at conclusions of some political significance is obviously open to serious objections. The instruments of alliance are a symptom of complete subservience rather than a reflection of actual legal relations prevailing between the contracting parties, and must be reinterpreted in the light of the changed political situation. It must nevertheless be recalled that the first four inter-satellite treaties were concluded before the creation of the Cominform and the following nine, including all but one in the Balkan-Danube region, before Tito's revolt at a time when Soviet control was not yet absolute.

The first obvious fact that emerges from a tabulation of a total of twenty-four military alliances is that Albania is not linked officially by such a treaty to the Soviet Union, and together with East Germany remains without a formal guarantee of Soviet military assistance in case of attack. Such a situation was not unreasonable so long as Tito was the Kremlin's staunchest ally. A treaty of July 9, 1946 linked Albania to Yugoslavia, and Albania's status was one of a sub-satellite, practically under the control and supervision of the Yugoslav government and Communist Party. The ultimate transformation of Albania into a federal state of Yugoslavia or the Balkan Federation was privately discussed.

Albania is now formally linked only to Bulgaria. The alliance signed December 16, 1947 ironically and without precedent stresses Albania's ties to Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union probably was and still is reluctant to commit itself formally to defend such an isolated and exposed position, preserving complete freedom of action depending on actual circumstances. The lack of formal Soviet pledges may prove

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to be fallacious, but an ostensibly Bulgarian airlift and sea supply of Soviet arms is more probably envisaged. 648 ●

East Germany, in the legally paradoxical position of an occupied part of an ex-enemy country and at the same time a Soviet satellite representing in Malenkov's recent words "a bulwark in the struggle for a united, peace-loving and democratic Germany," has so far concluded no alliance treaties either with the Soviet Union or with any of its satellites. Its treaty with Poland of July 6, 1950, recognizing the Oder-Neisse boundary as definitive, contains no military alliance clauses. However, the joint German-Polish, German-Czechoslovakian and German-Hungarian declarations of June 6, June 23 and June 24, 1950, respectively, represent an accession on the part of East Germany to the Soviet "peace" camp and a pledge to "use all its forces in order to foil the plans of the imperialist war incendiaries and to strengthen peace." In Soviet semantics this may create almost the same obligations as a formal alliance.

The alliances concluded by the Soviet Union with its six (now five) Eastern European satellites represent a consistent pattern. In these treaties the *casus foederis* bringing military assistance into operation does not consist in an overt act of aggression, but typically: "Should one of the . . . parties be involved in armed conflict with Germany, attempting to renew her policy of aggression, or with any other State allying itself with Germany, directly or in any other way, in her aggressive policy. . . . " (Art. 2, USSR-Rumania, and Art. 3, USSR-Czechoslovakia). The term "policy of aggression" was substituted and therefore probably means policy of "Drang nach Osten," and consequently may be applied to any official statement directed against the Oder-Neisse boundary, considered by the Soviet bloc as "the boundary of peace."

The Soviet alliances have two major characteristics: First, they are operative regardless of whether the attack originates from Germany or its allies, or from a member of the Soviet

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648 bloc. Of special importance in connection with the latter eventuality is the typical obligation preceding the *casus foederis* "to take jointly all measures in their power to remove any threat of repeated aggression on the part of Germany, or of any State allying itself with Germany directly or in any other way" (Art. I, par. 1, USSR-Rumania). The involvement may well arise from such "measures." Secondly, they are directed not only against Germany but also against any state allying itself directly or in any other way with Germany in its aggressive policy. This vague language may cover any kind of endorsement of the revision of Germany's present eastern border.

So far as Germany itself is concerned, such a *casus foederis* is based in part on the language of Article 53, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter which stipulates that the authorization of the Security Council is not required for "measures against any enemy state . . . provided for . . . in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state. . . ." This provision, absent from the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, was introduced in the joint amendments submitted by the Big Four to the San Francisco Conference on May 5, 1945. This formula was used by the Soviet Union even before that date. The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared that the satellite alliances are based on Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, although insofar as they are directed against the Western Powers they violate the Charter. The possibility of a pseudo-legal alibi for a unilateral Soviet military action against Germany and the North Atlantic powers after a ratification of the European Defense Community Pact should therefore be recognized.

A detailed analysis of the original sixteen (now only ten) inter-satellite alliances reveals roughly two separate types covering different though partially overlapping geographical sectors of the Soviet bloc. The links connecting countries

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located in different sectors belong to one or the other type 648 ● apparently at random.

The first group includes the Balkan and Danubian states (Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, Rumania and, formerly, Yugoslavia), which are bound together by treaties manifesting a consistent pattern. They are operative only in case of formal military aggression, and not in cases of aggression by means short of war. A typical provision reads: "In the event . . . [of] attack . . . [on] one of the . . . Parties threatening its independence, or to enslave it or sever part of its territory." Moreover they are directed not only nominally against Germany but more generally against "Germany or any third power," which in practice means against any state outside the Soviet bloc. Greece was mentioned by name together with "American and British imperialists" when some of the treaties were signed. Italy is also a possibility in connection with Albania. Obviously the name of Germany is used here as a transparent camouflage and the Balkan-Danubian bloc is a military alliance clearly directed against the Western powers and their allies in the region, although it is cast in the form of a defensive alliance.

The second, or northern group embracing Poland and Czechoslovakia—to which Hungary and Rumania are separately linked—forms a bloc partially overlapping with the first. They are connected by the type of alliances linking all satellites to the Soviet Union. The familiar provisions regarding "joint measures" against any threat of aggression by Germany or her allies, the "aggressive policy" of Germany as the *casus foederis*, and the direction of the treaties against states "joining Germany's aggressive policy directly or in any other way," are also to be found here, as well as the reference to Article 53 of the United Nations Charter.

The fact that the political and military alliances within the Soviet orbit are exclusively bilateral, has more than legal

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648 significance. It represents the application of the old Russian distrust and fear of multilateral groupings formed by neighbor states along Russia's borders. This traditional attitude has been applied by the Kremlin to its satellites in the Soviet orbit to prevent federation schemes and especially closer economic and ultimately political ties between Communist Poland and Communist Czechoslovakia, that might eventually give groups of these countries bargaining power with the Soviet Union.

III

648 727 In any discussion of the Soviet orbit—particularly during the developments of the first postwar years—a clear distinction must be made by the reader between two types of states. The first includes the former enemy countries: Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In the second are the countries that were in the Allied camp: Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

The former Axis satellites were required by the peace treaties to pay reparations not only to the Soviet Union but to certain allied countries as well. Thus Hungary was to pay reparations to Yugoslavia and to Czechoslovakia while Bulgaria was to pay Yugoslavia and Greece. Since payments were made in goods, they represented a budget item rather than items in international trade. The armistice agreements further established the right of the Soviet Union to charge Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania with the costs of occupation. The Potsdam Agreement also recognized the right of the Soviet Union to the so-called German and Italian assets located in the territories in these three countries. In this period the orbit served as a source of raw materials and a processor of finished and semifinished goods for the Soviet Union.

As early as 1945, the Soviet Union began to negotiate

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As early as 1945, the Soviet Union began to negotiate trade agreements with all the Eastern European countries. 648 439
In the beginning these trade agreements were limited to the determination of goods to be mutually delivered during a specific period of time. In time these trade agreements were replaced by more elaborate documents which established definite goals to be achieved in the exchange of commodities between the countries concerned. If the new treaties and agreements indicate anything, they indicate the primacy of economics in the Soviet outlook. This was but one means by which the preponderance of the Soviet Union in the area was assured.

Although the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was announced to the world in 1949, it is not yet clear that complete economic integration exists. What is clear is a trend to make the various captive countries of the orbit dependent upon the Soviet Union, since the area does not possess half the basic raw materials that it needs. Thus while there is no economic integration of the satellites as a regional bloc, there is a tendency because of their need for raw materials for them to become part of one centralized Soviet system.

This system is best evidenced by the existence of joint or 315 439
mixed companies. In Rumania, the oil fields are owned by a mixed Soviet-Rumanian company. In effect this means that the Soviets control Rumanian petroleum production. The Russian representatives on the company board control the majority of votes and are in a position to decide policies and production norms. In addition, the companies operate rent free, receive the highest priorities in labor, equipment and resources.

The extent of Soviet parasitism in Eastern Europe might 648 439
have remained a "state secret" had not the Yugoslavs divulged it to the world. As the Yugoslav *White Book* so well documents, one of their major criticisms of the Soviet behavior arose from the negotiations over the so-called Soviet-

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● 648 439 Yugoslav joint companies. The Yugoslav experience is of particular interest since it reflects that of the rest of the orbit. The Soviet Union and the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia signed an economic agreement on April 11, 1945. The communiqué released after the negotiations stated that the Soviet government agreed to supply the Yugoslav army with arms and ammunition on long-term credits and to aid in the restoration of the Yugoslav war industry. At the same time both sides agreed on mutual deliveries of goods. The Soviet government was to meet the requirements of the Yugoslav economy as to raw materials, technical advice and other services.

The signatories have never made public the details of this agreement, but the Yugoslav-Cominform differences threw some light on Soviet trading techniques. On March 31, 1949, *Borba*, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, charged that the Soviet government had violated the agreement for the financial support of Yugoslav students attending Soviet schools by forcing the Yugoslav government to pay for their upkeep in dollars instead of dinars. It also charged that the Soviet Union unilaterally reduced the volume of trade and that the Soviet government forced the Yugoslavs to sell their raw materials at prices below world market prices.

In his description on October 7, 1949, of the operations of Soviet-Yugoslav joint companies, Dr. Vilfan, permanent Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations, branded Russia as an exploiter. Speaking before the Economic and Financial Committee of the United Nations, Dr. Vilfan described Soviet imperialist practices. As an example, he cited the Joint Yugoslav-Soviet Steamship Company (Juspad). Russia, he claimed, had among other things rigged the transportation charges, causing a loss of $19,000,000 to Yugoslavia in 1948. Vilfan further observed that "the superiority of capi-

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talist monopoly has been replaced by the monopolistic position of the more developed Socialist country." 648 439

While Soviet economic policy had much to do with Yugoslavia's ultimate defection from the orbit, the causes lie deep in Yugoslavia's historical experience and that of Tito and his party's rise to political power. Many of the documents regarding the break have been published, yet much more has to be made available before a definitive judgment can be made and many questions answered.

IV

One fact that should be made clear regarding Yugoslavia and its role in the Soviet orbit is that Tito never "broke" with Moscow. While it is true Tito declined the invitation to attend a Cominform meeting called to consider his case, his action cannot be described as a break. It was Moscow that gave Tito the *coup de main*. It was not until a year later that the Yugoslavs attacked Stalin openly. 648

For centuries, the geographical position of Yugoslavia has made the country a target for political and military pressures from all sides. Now, to the struggle for the control of Yugoslavia's land and sea positions and her resources, the break between Moscow and Belgrade adds a contest for the control of the minds and unquestioned obedience of men. Since Yugoslav Partisans based their National Liberation Movement on the principle of unconditional loyalty to the Soviet Union, prior to the break the Soviet Union had a privileged and controlling position in Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policy, resources, and manpower.

The institutional system of Yugoslavia fully indicated the allegiance the Partisan leaders had pledged to the Kremlin, and faithfully reflected the structure of the Soviet Union. The People's Front, with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

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● 648 at its head, differed only slightly from Russia's one-party state. In external affairs, too, Yugoslavia supported the Soviet Union's aims in Eastern Europe by doing its part to make that area safe for Russia. It participated in the Soviet network of political alliances, it maintained close economic relations with the Soviet Union, it voted in unison with the Soviet bloc in the United Nations General Assembly and its agencies, it participated in the establishment of the Cominform, it sponsored the Pan-Slav Congresses in Eastern Europe and it acted as a supply and training base for violations of the frontiers of the Greek state.

Neither before nor since the dispute have the Yugoslavs given the Western powers opportunities similar to those afforded the Russians, despite the fact that the present regime relied heavily during the Second World War on British technical assistance and on American Lend-Lease.

During the war, the Anglo-Americans supported Tito and his followers solely on grounds of military necessity, and only the British gave some thought to the political consequences of their actions. The two Western powers based their policy on the fact that Tito's Partisans were killing Germans more effectively than their countrymen, the Royalist and anti-Communist Chetniks, who committed political suicide by confusing the main issue of fighting the Nazi invader with their secondary aim of carrying on a civil war with the Partisans and non-Serbian groups. From the start, Tito demanded Western aid not only for military reasons but also for the ultimate purpose of imposing his own political and economic system upon Yugoslavia.

It seems in retrospect that the Western powers made two mistaken assumptions in regard to the Partisans. They believed that the Soviet Union would permit a "representative" government in Yugoslavia after the termination of hostilities, and that Tito and the Partisans would repay their military obligations in acceptable political tender. Once the Commu-

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nist Party in Yugoslavia seized power, at the end of the war, the thin veneer of friendship for the West disappeared. In unison with its neighbors, Yugoslavia directed its controlled press and radio to speak in diatribes and strictures against the "capitalistic and warmongering Western democracies," and, at the same time, to speak in glowing terms of their brother Slavs and comrades-in-arms, the people of the Soviet Union.

The rupture between Belgrade and Moscow has not changed this picture in its essentials. Soviet pressure on Tito has not caused him to alter the existing one-party political or economic structure of his country. Just as Tito has demanded that the socialist countries base their relationships on the principle of equality because he is aware of the Soviet Union's aims in Europe, so too he will resist Western demands for the modification of his policies in return for economic and military support.

The Soviet Union erred in trying arbitrarily to mold the Balkan area to the Kremlin pattern. It failed, in the manner of dictatorships, to take into account the long South Slav tradition of opposition to tyranny and conquest. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union's expansionist plans, the pattern did not allow for the forces of human nature, of which there seem to be more in the Balkans than elsewhere in the world. Only if one recognizes that this is a problem in power relations rather than an ideological dispute, can one grasp the full implications of this dispute.

The shift of Yugoslavia at this juncture is best described by what has been termed "integral nationalism," which expresses itself in totalitarian terms. Integral nationalism is totalitarian not only in domestic affairs, but in foreign affairs as well. The nation attempts to make itself feared or "respected" by pursuing firm and bold policies. The nature of Tito's rise to power, the geographical characteristics of Yugoslavia, and Tito's power position relative to the Balkan states

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• 648 have all contributed to the making of Titoism. Specifically,
186 Titoism can be defined as a form of nationalism which conceives of Yugoslavia as an end in itself, and the rulers of that country are concerned only with the exclusive pursuit of national policies. It is thus not unique in political history nor does it contribute anything new to the diplomatic techniques available to the Western democracies. Titoism is then but a matter of lack of loyalty to a higher power center outside the national state itself.

648 Tito and his colleagues in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia exhibited the utmost faith and loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union throughout the war and in the immediate postwar years. Certainly in this period Tito was a marked Stalinist "internationalist." That is, one "who is ready to serve the Soviet Union unreservedly, unhesitatingly, unconditionally. . . ." The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was the sole Communist Party to engage in partisan warfare in the days immediately after the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany. Up to 1948 the Yugoslav government was completely servile to the Soviet programs in the world diplomatic forums.

The Soviet Union had undoubtedly cast another role for Tito than that of a mere extra on the diplomatic stage. In May of 1946, Tito arrived in Moscow for a number of discussions regarding armament. How important this meeting was is best indicated by the rank of the individuals he took with him. Not only was he accompanied by Alexander Rankovich, who as Minister of Interior is also head of the secret police, but also the chiefs of staff of all the armed services. While it is not known what Tito promised in return for Soviet arms, one is able to speculate from the series of events which began the following month.

In July, Yugoslavia and Albania signed a military alliance, and in August two American planes were shot down in the vicinity of the Austrian-Yugoslavian border. Aid to the Greek Communists began in September; in the following month

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British destroyers were struck by mines in the Corfu Channel, and at the same time the wave of imprisonment of individuals who might prove dangerous to the regime rose even higher than heretofore. By Christmas of 1947, Radio Belgrade announced the existence of the Greek Communist guerrillas as a "free and democratic" government. But this was not recognition. What the Greek Communists required was that very act, and open resistance which would go beyond that already granted by Tito and which was vigorously criticized by the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.

Who then was to recognize the Greek Communists first? Certainly not Stalin, but Tito who occupied the central position. Undoubtedly Tito was impressed by the counter measures issued by the Western Powers: the immediacy of American air and sea power then in the Mediterranean, and the announcement of the Truman Doctrine on aid to Greece and Turkey. It is almost mathematically certain that if Tito had recognized the Greek Communists, the war would have been fought on the streets of Belgrade and not on the bare mountains of Greece. How Stalin tried to bribe Tito into recognition is implicit in the negotiations on the Balkan federation in Moscow in February 1948. Stalin proposed that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria unite, and in so doing bring Albania into their fold. Although Tito's representatives did not accept this proposal, Kardelj signed an agreement with Molotov agreeing to mutual consultation on matters relating to foreign policy. Stalin was seemingly now in a position to control Tito and Soviet advisers were serving with the Yugoslav army. Tito's rejection of the invitation to participate in the Marshall Plan made the success of the Yugoslav Five Year Plan contingent upon Stalin's generosity, and the signing of the articles on mutual consultation on foreign affairs closed the circle.

Yet the fact remains that Tito did not recognize the Greek Communist guerrillas. For between the pressures exerted by the Kremlin on one hand and the West on the other, Tito

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● 648 chose to keep Yugoslavia intact by refusing to become a mere instrument of Soviet policy. He undoubtedly saw clearly that the Kremlin took no risks and would certainly get all of the benefits accruing from these political adventures. In the light of Stalin's definition of a true internationalist, this is what the Cominform communiqué meant when it denounced the Communist party of Yugoslavia as identifying "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers," a policy "appropriate only to nationalists."

668 665 What effect has Tito's departure from the table of "brotherly Communist parties" had on those parties? Titoism is primarily a matter of loyalties. In Yugoslavia, there was no higher loyalty than to the state personified by Tito himself. Consequently, the party, the army, and the new bureaucracy could and did remain faithful to Tito. If Titoism is to spread, similar conditions and a similar concept of limited loyalty must exist in the people's democracies. To date there is no evidence that Titoism has taken root in the effective leadership circles of the satellite states, since both Western-minded and Moscow-trained Communists have been affected by the purges. Certainly the purges of Communist leaders in satellite Europe which have occurred since 1948 afford no index as to the extent of Titoism. The purgees had no machinery for independence of action available to Tito. Even if they had, it is not sure they would have acted as Tito did if faced with the choice.

648 What effect has the break had on Yugoslavia itself—on its policies and political philosophy? From the time of the break in June 1948 until November 1949, the Yugoslavs inveighed against the Communist parties of the satellites but not against the sacrosanct personage of Joseph Stalin. The second Cominform meeting held in November 1949 proved quite conclusively to Tito that there were no longer any grounds for conciliation, and he prepared a new political

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dialectic which would reflect the changes in his country's international position.

First, the policies of the Soviet Union and the ideas of Stalin himself were attacked as marked departures from the true path of Socialism. Second, in contradistinction to the policies of "bureaucratic state capitalism" evolved by the Kremlin and followed in slavish pattern by the satellites, Yugoslavia decentralized its machinery of economic planning, gave greater power to workers' councils, reorganized local government, and re-wrote the national constitution. An interesting feature of the recently amended constitution is the provision for a Council of Producers, as one of the two parliamentary bodies. In this council industrial workers are disproportionately represented by 135 deputies, while only 67 represent agriculture. Under this arrangement, the agricultural population has one representative for every 150,825 peasants, while the urban is represented by one deputy for every 30,239 workers.

In its organization, the Council of Producers is strikingly similar to another proposal advanced by another state that adopted the philosophy of integral nationalism, Mussolini's Corporative Italy. According to the latter, the corporations were instruments responsible for "the regulation of the productive forces, with a view to the development of the wealth, the political power and the well-being of the Italian people." This statement of purpose does not differ greatly from the ideology advanced by Kardelj on behalf of the new constitution.

In any event, the character of the power structure—that is, the structure of social power focused on the state—has not changed. Decentralized though the power may be, the Communist party still controls the councils where important decisions are made. Effective opposition to the regime is still unknown. Democrats who have opposed Tito and his policies still remain imprisoned and, while important concessions

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freely choose. To ease the complex and subtle problems of culture, emotions, and psychology, it was hoped that the federation would insure widespread opportunities for education. It was hoped that it would give to the inhabitants of the region both social and international prestige. It was hoped that it would bring them to a status of equality with the reference groups which they had chosen as yardsticks for comparison, or that in some way an Eastern European federation would make its citizens the equals not only of the French and German peoples but perhaps in time even of the English and American peoples, who have now become the reference groups for standards of achievement throughout the world. Finally it was hoped that such a federation would give rise to inspiring common enterprises that would unite the peoples of Eastern Europe in a new sense of their own identity, as in past centuries the monarchies of Western Europe, according to the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, have united their own peoples into a sense of dignity and nationhood.

In striking contrast to the splendor of these visions was their relative poverty in specific detail. None of the larger projects for federation in this region were ever negotiated by governments or even by responsible political leaders from the different areas. There was a negotiated project of the Polish-Czechoslovakian federation, worked out by Czechoslovakian and Polish leaders-in-exile during the Second World War, but this project which included only two states in the region was not followed up by the established governments or by the major political organizations after the war.[3]

[3] Cf. United States Department of State, Division of Library and Reference Services, *Danubian Federation: An Annotated Bibliography* (*Bibliography No. 66*), Washington, D.C., October 28, 1952 (multigraphed); Felikas Gross, *Crossroads of Two Continents: A Democratic Federation of East-Central Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 28-34, and for the text of the Polish-Czechoslovakian Declaration, signed in London on January 25, 1942, by representatives of the two

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•648 Projects for a Balkan union usually failed to include even the Danubian states and practically never reached out toward Poland and the Baltic. Projects for a Baltic union usually remained limited to Poland and the small Baltic states, leaving the latter faced with the prospect of becoming a minority in what would become in practice a greater Poland.

000 Perhaps most of the substance behind the projects for federation did not consist so much in plans for the future as in memories of the past, and in particular of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. A reconstituted and enlarged Austria-Hungary, reaching in the North through the accession of Poland and the Baltic states to the shores of the Baltic Sea and including in the South all the Balkan states down to the border perhaps of Turkey, would sum up the many projects for uniting Eastern Europe which have been discussed so often during the last thirty years. It is the general project of a federation of the Danubian countries, enlarged by the addition of Poland to the north, and conceivably by that of Albania and Greece in the south, which needs closer examination.

It is true that such a federation would carry a certain amount of international prestige by virtue of the sheer numbers of its inhabitants, the enormous sums of productive capacities, natural resources, and miles of railroad track scattered throughout the area. Any more fundamental and lasting prestige, however, might well depend upon the effective military capabilities and the actual levels of economic prosperity and growth, and of educational progress and political democracy which the federation could maintain.

The obvious military task for such a federation would be to form a counterweight to Germany or Russia, or to both of them together. Many of these military tasks, how-

governments-in-exile, pp. 102-104; Antoni Plutynski, *We Are 115 Millions* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1944), pp. 33-36, 114-122; etc.

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that were used to bypass Congress on delicate issues of foreign policy. Moreover, the prospect of a prolonged struggle with Japan after the defeat of Germany served only to increase this caution regarding commitments in Europe. That this assumption regarding American opinion was soundly based became evident as soon as the war was over, when the rapid demobilization of the armed forces and the abrupt termination of Lend-Lease reflected the belief of the American voter that with the military defeat of the enemy a stable peace had been established.

In addition to these considerations, it should be noted that President Roosevelt apparently left the Tehran Conference convinced that Stalin's promises and statements of policy could be taken at face value. Although the President would have been quick to recognize the fallacy of this assumption once the evidence became available, as is clear from his reaction to events in Poland during the last weeks of his life, he spoke and acted during the period in which the determining decisions were made as though the extension of Soviet and Communist influence were matters of no serious concern. In his Fourth Inaugural Address, in what was intended to be a summary of his political philosophy, President Roosevelt conveyed to the American public his views on foreign policy in a manner that was characteristic of his thinking during this period:

> We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community.
>
> We have learned the simple truth, as Emerson said, that, 'The only way to have a friend is to be one.'
>
> We can gain no lasting peace if we approach it with suspicion and mistrust—or with fear. We can gain it only if we proceed with the understanding and the courage which flow from conviction.

In view of the predominant American influence in the war councils of the Western allies, the major dispositions made in the last year of the war all tended to leave Eastern Europe

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• 646 to the Russians. The decision to weaken the campaign in Italy—with the possibility of pressing on into the Danubian region—in order to invade southern France in the summer of 1944, followed from this attitude, as did the granting to the Soviet High Command of overriding powers in the armistice terms concluded with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Under the circumstances, the only limitations placed on Soviet influence in Eastern Europe were those created by the advance of the allied armies in the West and by the prompt British occupation of Greece. By the time of the Yalta conference this tendency to accept a Soviet orbit in Eastern Europe was in full swing. It followed logically that the provisional postwar governments of Poland and Yugoslavia should be based on the Communist regimes already on the spot and that full confidence should be placed in the Soviet agreement to assist "the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people."

In the immediate postwar period, the American and British foreign ministers made some effort through diplomacy to reduce Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. By this time, however, their bargaining power had been largely dissipated, since neither their own governments nor public opinion gave them strong support, and the U.S.S.R. found it necessary to make few concessions to win the Western signatures to the peace treaties concluded with the former Axis satellites in 1947. By the end of that year the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania were in Soviet hands, and that of Czechoslovakia was within easy reach. Exceptional circumstances limited Soviet influence in Yugoslavia and permitted Tito to break loose in 1948, but after this incident the Soviet hold on the other countries in Eastern Europe was tightened and these countries were soon consolidated into a closely knit political and economic orbit.

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[For military organization in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania and for the Russian domination of the military in these satellite countries see category 116, pp. 1-117, 147-154]